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The Zig zags of Po lit i cal Re gime
De moc ra ti za tion in Ukraine1
Ab stract
The ar ti cle is ded i cated to dis cus sion of the main fea tures of po lit i cal re -
gime trans for ma tion in post-so viet Ukraine. In def i ni tion of po lit i cal re -
gime the au thor fol lows the ac tor-cen tered neo-in sti tu tional ap proach
that al lows fo cus ing on in di vid ual and col lec tive so cial prac tices de ter -
mined by an ac tor’s in ter ests, sit u a tion, and strat egy of ac tion, as well
as lim ited by his/her hab its, so cial skills, re sources, and rules. The au -
thor ar gues an il lib eral dem o cratic char ac ter of for mer po lit i cal re gime,
which was em bod ied at the end of 1990s in Ukraine, and dis cusses the 
zig zags of its fu ture de vel op ment. The ques tion about so cial and po lit i -
cal fac tors of the Or ange Rev o lu tion ex plo sion is also ex am ined.
The ways of rather long de vel op ment in the so ci et ies, which ap peared
af ter the state so cial ism had crashed, still do not show any kind of so cial
re la tions to be their aim (or the kind they have al ready con structed) and
what is (or would be) the place of de moc racy in them. At the be gin ning of
trans for ma tion, the unique his tor i cal op por tu nity to go back to cap i tal -
ism, to get rid of to tal con trol un der con di tions of ru in ing So viet em pire,
along with a sense of free dom pros pects, gave birth to his tor i cal op ti -
mism and this was re flected in one of the first fun da men tal col lec tive
works on peres troika and its per spec tives There is no other way (“Inogo
ne dano”), un der the ed i tor ship of Yu. Afanas’yev [1]. It is un der stand -
able why, in the first part of 1990s, many cog ni tive mod els sup ported by
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re search ers of post-com mu nist so ci et ies were ori ented to the im per a tive
of in ev i ta ble tran si tion to de moc racy. 
How ever from the mid dle of 1990s, many po lit i cal events and re sults
of nu mer ous sur veys raised doubts about the cer tainty. So cial and po lit -
i cal re la tions be ing formed in so ci et ies of for mer state so cial ism more
and more ev i dently dem on strated other con tent of var i ous kinds hid den
be hind the fa cade of mar ket and dem o cratic in sti tu tions. In par tic u lar,
bas ing on the re sults of re search pro gram Ba rom e ter of New De moc ra -
cies by Paul Lazarsfeld So ci ety, in the end of 1990s, R. Rose, W. Mishler,
and Ch. Haerpfer con cluded about di ver gent de moc ra ti za tion in post-
 com mu nist coun tries and iden ti fied four groups of coun tries ac cord ing
to their man i fes ta tion of con sol i dated ver sus un con sol i dated de moc ra -
cies. The first group of “con sol i dated” though “im per fect” de moc racy
con sisted of Po land, Czech Re pub lic, Hun gary, and Slovenia. The fourth
group in cluded Rus sia, Ukraine, and Belarus, where pros pects of lib eral 
de moc racy were as sessed as prob lem atic [2, pp. 223–227]. One of the
most com pe tent re search ers of trans form ing re gimes, Th. Carothers,
con cluded that most coun tries of “the third wave” de moc ra ti za tion left
func tional de moc racy per spec tives and went back to au thor i tar i an ism
(Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus) or found them selves stuck in the
“gray zone” be tween de moc racy and dic ta tor ship (Rus sia, Ukraine1, etc.)
[4]. Not long ago, we could hear more and more opin ions about that
Ukraine, as well as Rus sia, has turned to au thor i tar i an ism. 
At the same time, post-com mu nist trans for ma tion pro cesses in the
coun tries of East ern Eu rope and the for mer USSR show that so cial de -
vel op ment is not pre de ter mined. Re search ers can say about dom i nant
ten den cies of for ma tion and re pro duc tion as to so cial forms, but side
ten den cies of cer tain pe ri ods (in clud ing coun ter-ten den cies), co op er a -
tive ef fects, un pre dict able re sults of peo ple’s ac tions in ter fere in the
course of events and make the “im pos si ble” pos si ble. What hap pened in
Ukraine in the end of 2004 is one of the bright est ex am ples of such “his -
tor i cal zig zags”. In this ar ti cle, we will try to de ter mine the lead ing ten -
den cies in trans for ma tion of po lit i cal re gime of the post-so viet Ukraine.
Some time ago, these ten den cies were mainly sim i lar in Ukraine and
Rus sia but their dif fer ences, es pe cially now, give opportunity of taking
various ways for these countries and those like them.
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Con cep tual Ap proach to the Stud ies
on Po lit i cal Re gime and De moc ra ti za tion Pro cess
The way of see ing and ex pla na tion of so cial phe nom ena taken by a re -
searcher is a “glass”, through which we can see cer tain and al ways lim -
ited re al ity. Putt ing aside dis cus sions on ben e fits and draw backs of var i -
ous ap proaches to def i ni tion of a re gime1 and con cep tu al iza tion of de -
moc ra ti za tion phe nom e non, we would like to ex plain the way of see ing
that ap plied in this study and based on meth od ol ogy of the  activity -
structural syn the sis and ac tor-cen tered in sti tu tional ap proach2. This ap -
proach makes it pos si ble to fo cus anal y sis on in di vid ual and col lec tive
prac tices of peo ple: (à) de ter mined by their in ter ests, sit u a tions, and
strat e gies, (b) lim ited by their hab its, so cial skills and struc tures of re -
sources and rules. 
Within this ap proach and tra di tion by G. O’Donnell and P. Schmitter
[6, p. 73], we un der stand po lit i cal re gime as ex plicit and im plicit mod -
els of ac cess to gov ern men tal and man a ge rial po si tions formed in a cer -
tain so cial sys tem, which are de ter mined and lim ited by in ter ests, hab -
its, so cial skills of in ter ested ac tors, struc tures of re sources and rules,
as well as strat e gies for their achieve ment. The mat ter of ap pear ing mod -
els is less a re sult of pur pose ful de ci sions, but more a re sult of co op er a -
tive ef fects of in ter ac tions be tween peo ple and in sti tu tions in volved in
cer tain struc tural and cul tural con di tions, try ing to re al ize their own in -
ter ests by adapt ing to struc tural bar ri ers, over com ing them (or pass ing
round) in ac cor dance with the ideas about what we want, what we can,
and how we can.
To what ex tent a sub stance of a new or re pro duced re gime could be
de scribed by the term de moc racy? To an swer this ques tion, we need to
add spec i fi ca tions to the ba sic def i ni tion of po lit i cal re gime. That is why;
our next state ment is about the de moc racy phe nom e non in mod ern so -
ci et ies. As many re search ers no ticed, when we try to ap proach it, the
phe nom e non “slips away” that leads to ca su istry in the o ret i cal in ter pre -
ta tions [9]. In the va ri ety of in ter pre ta tions, one of the most ac tively used
is the def i ni tion de vel oped within tra di tions by J. Schumpeter and R.
Dahl [10]. This def i ni tion im plies a va ri ety of real forms of de moc racy
(polyarchy) and, in its most gen eral un der stand ing, de moc racy is a po lit i -
72 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005
Olha Kutsenko
1
For ex am ple, see: [5].
2
As ap plied to the anal y sis of po lit i cal pro cesses, see: [6–8].
cal mech a nism of so cial or der that pre vent from any power and gov ern -
men tal mo nop oly. Three interrelated features can measure this sense of
democracy: 
— Ex is tence and ex tent (scale, ef fi ciency) of po lit i cal com pe ti tion.
— Ex is tence, scale, and ef fi ciency of po lit i cal in volve ment.
— Role of the law in the rules, ac cord ing to which the re gime acts. 
The last fea ture, sug gested by F. Zakaria and de vel oped by W. Mer kel
and A. Cruissen [11], makes it pos si ble to avoid meth od olog i cal col li sion
in ex pla na tions of “gray zone” re gimes [4] and along with the au thors to
ad mit ex is tence of il lib eral (“de fec tive” by W. Mer kel and A. Cruissen)
forms of de moc racy. 
Power al ways sup poses asym met ric re la tions. When the power re la -
tions are based on com pul sion, it is ob vi ous. How ever, asym me try ap -
pears even when the power is based on mu tual with the pub lic in ter ests
or the value con gru ity: the asym me try be comes a re sult of in ev i ta ble
con trol by dom i nat ing ac tors over re sources, in for ma tion, in ter pre ta -
tions of val ues and senses and, at last, a re sult of “ac tions with out the
rules” (def i ni tion by O. Wil liam son — [12]) for achiev ing goals. From this
point of view, in all its man i fes ta tions, de moc racy can be de scribed as an
ex tent of sym me try / asym me try of such re la tions. Asym me try of power
re la tions can be smoothed over by var i ous me di a tors, such as dem o -
cratic in sti tu tions: par ties, non-gov ern men tal or ga ni za tions, elec tions,
PR forms, elec toral and par lia men tary scenes; they es tab lish and le git i -
mize the rules of game for par tic i pa tion. How ever, with out op por tu ni ties
for di rect com mu ni ca tion be tween the power hold ers and the pub lic,
these forms not only sub sti tute the di rect com mu ni ca tion, but also
bring in stead dem on stra tive and ma nip u la tive pub lic ity to in sti tu tions
that act “over the pub lic’s head” — Ju. Habermas con vinc ingly showed
this [13, pp. 190–197]. The pub lic is left with the role of a wit ness in this
pro cess. The pub lic as a whole is re duced to a “vot ing per son” and “wit -
ness-par tic i pant of po lit i cal events” ini ti ated or pro voked by bear ers of
in flu ence re sources. This idea is im por tant for un der stand ing that de -
vel op ment of var i ous forms of real de moc racy cor re sponds not only
(of ten even less) to liberal principles. 
The most im por tant dif fer ence be tween lib eral and il lib eral (“de fec -
tive”) de moc ra cies lies in ex is tence or ab sence of solid guar an tees for the
ba sic po lit i cal rights and lib er ties, as well as ef fec tive hor i zon tal con trol
[11, p. 7]. Due to the men tioned spe cific char ac ter, il lib eral de moc ra cies
bal ance be tween lib eral de moc racy and au toc racy, while the pub lic and
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in ter ested ac tors have to work hard in or der to re tain the regime in the
field of democratic procedures. 
To fol low this the o ret i cal logic, we have to ad mit that, in the first part
of 1990s in Ukraine, there were formed rather sta ble for mal and  pro -
cedural in sti tu tions of de moc racy: com pet i tive elec tions, par lia ments,
multi- party sys tem, non-gov ern men tal me dia, etc.; at the same time, al -
ter na tive po lit i cal re gimes and ways of gov ern ing be come sig nif i cantly
less pop u lar. All this makes it pos si ble to de scribe the re gime es tab lished
on this ba sis as dem o cratic as a whole. How ever, an swers to the fol low ing
ques tions — what kind of de moc racy and what pros pects of the regime
development — are to be discussed. 
What De moc racy is Pos si ble?
Within the ap plied meth od ol ogy, to an swer this ques tion, we have to
ex am ine the rules (for mal and in for mal) and prac tices for ac cess to gov -
ern men tal and man a ge rial po si tions, as well as ac tors (rep re sen ta tives
of elites or non-elite groups) in ter ested in the ac cess from the view point
of their re sources, so cial skills, hab its, and strat e gies. We will fo cus only
on prin ci pal as pects of anal y sis. As an em pir i cal ba sis, we used the data
of an nual na tional mon i tor ing con ducted by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of
the NAS of Ukraine and by the In ter na tional Fund of Elec toral Sys tems;
also, in or der to make our re sults more ac cu rate, we used the data of the
quar terly mon i tor ing of 2003–2004 con ducted in Luhansk oblast by the
So cio log i cal Lab o ra tory, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, and
supervised by the author. 
For mal and pro ce dural de moc racy, es tab lished in Ukraine in the mid -
dle of 1990s, was not a prod uct of his tor i cal evo lu tion of civil so ci ety that
stood for its in ter ests, lib er ties and de vel oped mech a nisms en sur ing
them. Dem o cratic forms were a re sult of de lib er ate in volve ment of elites
(lead ing ac tors of which of ten had far from dem o cratic in ter ests), a re sult 
of leg is la tive in tro duc tion of pro ce dural el e ments of de moc racy. Ac cord -
ing to the logic of tran si tion to lib eral de moc racy and mar ket econ omy,
the most im por tant aim and re sult of such in sti tu tional changes would
have been sep a ra tion of power and property (or business), politics, and
administration. 
At the same time, it did not hap pen mostly be cause elites that car ried
out in sti tu tional re forms with out any con trol of weak civil so ci ety were
not in ter ested in such hap pen ing. In ter ests and aims of elites and new
rul ing class be ing formed were hid den be hind the de moc racy rhet o ric,
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while in fact their goal was to en sure their own su prem acy in the sys tem
of power and prop erty. They es tab lished the rules of game meant to con -
trol the most im por tant po si tions on the po lit i cal field and use the gov -
ern ment to gether with cor rup tion mech a nisms for “cap tur ing” the for -
mer state own er ship1. The es tab lished rules in her ited a lot of typ i cal in -
ter ac tion forms that were char ac ter is tic of the late so viet so ci ety, but
these rules be came stricter and cyn i cal. Strong de pend ence of in sti tu -
tional changes on ste reo types, ori en ta tions, and reg u la tions of liv ing
rooted in the past bent the “tem po ral ar row” of de moc racy and caused
re verse mo tion to the sus tain able re pro duc tion of au thor i tar ian and pa -
ter nal is tic re la tions in po lit i cal sys tem. Be tween this type of re la tions and
pro ce dural forms of de moc racy, there ex isted structural synthesis giving 
birth to symbiotic forms of illiberal democratic regime and jeopardizing
democracy. 
In Ukraine, there were also im por tant fac tors, which formed the po lit -
i cal re gime and de ter mined its spe cific fea tures:
— The na tional elites’ weak ness and a high ex tent of their po lit i cal
po lar iza tion, which be came ev i dent in the be gin ning of 1990s.
— Strong com pe ti tion of pri vate in ter ests for gain ing con trol over the
gov ern ment.
— Man ag ers who worked for the for mer sys tem were left to hold the
key ad min is tra tive posts at the na tional and re gional lev els.
— To the end of 1990s, the rul ing elites were con sol i dated with ac -
tors-lead ers.
— Bu reau cratic cor rup tion that re al ized mech a nisms for the state
cap ture was flour ish ing.
— Due to the above-men tioned fac tors, there was a low peo ple’s trust
in the new pol icy, in sti tu tions, and lead ers.
In 1990s, de moc racy did not be come a “game for all with out ex cep -
tion” [15] ei ther for elites or the pub lic. It was only a short pe riod — in the
be gin ning of 1990s — when, in Ukraine, there was a rise of civil in ter est
and trust in power in sti tu tions among the pub lic. How ever, from 1993 —
what a par a dox of the time when pro ce dural forms of de moc racy were be -
ing im ple mented — it was reg is tered a sharp fall in these in di ca tors. Ac -
cord ing to the an nual na tional mon i tor ing con ducted by the In sti tute of
So ci ol ogy of the NAS of Ukraine, since 1994, the Ukrai ni ans’ trust in key
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The “state cap ture” no tion and mech a nisms, see: [14].
po lit i cal in sti tu tions and lead ers has been reg is tered at 7–12% (“to tal”
and “par tial trust”)1 with in sig nif i cant an nual changes [16, p. 20]. 
At the same time, at re gional lev els, the peo ple’s trust in most sub -
jects of power was higher — in par tic u lar, it could be seen in the data of
our mon i tor ing sur veys in Luhansk oblast (Fig ure 1). The per son i fied
trust in rep re sen ta tives of oblast and lo cal au thor i ties was 1.5–2 times
higher than trust in the su preme power in sti tu tions. Tak ing this into ac -
count, we can note the ex tremely sig nif i cant splash of trust in the for mer
Prime Min is ter, V. Yanukovych. This was reg is tered last year at least in
Luhansk oblast.
Low trust was not only a prod uct of de struc tion in the in sti tu tional
trust sys tem that had es tab lished in time of the USSR but — to a great
ex tent or even mostly — a re sult of bad ap praisal that peo ple gave to the
work of power in sti tu tions, a gap be tween ex pec ta tions and real ac tiv ity
of power in sti tu tions. 
Since the end of 1993, this con di tion has been ac com pa nied by low er -
ing peo ple’s trust in de moc racy as a mech a nism ca pa ble of lim it ing
power mo nop oly and by growth in neg a tive ap prais als of the ex ist ing re -
gime. Ac cord ing to the data col lected by the In ter na tional Fund of Elec -
toral Sys tems, from 1997, over half re spon dents stated that Ukraine was 
not a dem o cratic state; in 2003, this in di ca tor was at the high (for the
whole mon i tor ing sur veys pe riod) — 64% of re spon dents [17, pp. 20–21].
This can be sup ported by the data of six mon i tor ing sur veys be ing con -
ducted from April 2003 till No vem ber 2004 in Luhansk oblast by the So -
cio log i cal Lab o ra tory, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv Na tional Uni ver sity. As sess -
ing the pros pects of Ukraine as a dem o cratic state, 60–68% of re spon -
dents de cid edly an swered that in the near fu ture in Ukraine, dem o cratic
de vel op ment would be im pos si ble (Fig ure 2), 20% of them told that real
de moc racy in Ukraine was im pos si ble. 
In De cem ber 2000, among those in ter ested in pol i tics, 42% to tally or
par tially agreed that they could in flu ence the de ci sions taken in the
coun try via elec tions, and in the end of 2003 — that is af ter the par lia -
men tary elec tion of 2002 and be fore the pres i den tial elec tion of 2004 —
this fig ure less ened to 29% [17, p. 33]. Dur ing 1990s, the term de moc -
racy lost its ideal im age, which was re flected in the ev ery day life; the re al -
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turned into the op po site one.
ity hap pened to be far from even the most “grounded” ide als. More over,
ev ery day life ex pe ri ence did not break through very care ful at ti tudes of
peo ple to de moc racy as some thing brought from out side; there was not
formed the be lief in abil ity of dem o cratic in sti tu tions to en sure peo ple’s
par tic i pa tion in lim i ta tion of power mo nop oly; as usual, the feel ing of
free dom ab sence in the state was deep.
So cial ef fects of this sit u a tion were: po lit i cal ap a thy of the “si lent
ma jor ity”, ex tremely low le git i macy of power in sti tu tions, non-con -
certed for mal and in for mal po lit i cal prac tices. De moc racy has not
be come an un con di tional value for Ukrai ni ans.  
These and other facts con trib uted to the sit u a tion that in 2000 the so -
ci ety as a whole, es pe cially lib eral pub lic had a feel ing of de moc racy
doom, ex pected re verse mo tion and turn from il lib eral de moc racy to au to -
c racy. 
How ever, in the be gin ning of 2000s, the so cial sit u a tion in Ukraine
un der went a strange change: there started an ac tive pro cess of in ter -
est struc tur ing among so cial lay ers of elites and pub lic, the he ge -
mony model of re gime con sol i da tion seemed to be ex hausted. 
From 2001 in Ukraine, there be came ev i dent the intra-elite split based
mostly on the con flict re lated to ap pro pri a tion and ways of con trol. This
split could not be over come by tra di tional ad min is tra tive or cli en tele
means. In the be gin ning of 2000, the “party in power” lost a part of in flu -
en tial oli gar chic busi ness-par ties and a sig nif i cant part of na tional and
dem o cratic sub-elites. They started to po si tion them selves in the po lit i cal
field in a new way. Po lit i cal fight for su prem acy, for pos si bil ity to have po lit -
i cal and ad min is tra tive con trol over com pe ti tion in the mar ket, in clud ing
pri vat iza tion of stra te gic ob jects left in state own er ship, con trol over peo -
ple’s loy alty, this fight be came stron ger and even cruel in 2004 [see: 18]. It
was not ac ci den tally that be fore the new pres i den tial elec tion — from the
spring (April–July) 2004 — there hap pened the prin ci pal turn in the
large-scale pri vat iza tion: the most ex pen sive and at trac tive state ob jects
that waited to be sold for years sud denly and quickly were pri vat ized by
rep re sen ta tives of the rul ing busi ness and po lit i cal elite, and they paid
very low price. Thus, the po lit i cal re forms failed and, un der pres sure of
op po si tion, the po lit i cal fight flew to the pres i den tial elec tion cam paign. 
At the same time, busi ness (small and mid dle, mostly re lated to trade
and in ter me di ary), highly skilled spe cial ists, “pro fes sion als” started to
de clare their in ter ests more per sis tently; among rep re sen ta tives of large
busi ness, there was grow ing dis sat is fac tion with their de pend ence on
po lit i cal con junc ture, high “taxes” to get the power pro tec tion. The sur -
veys of the be gin ning of 2000s (con ducted, in par tic u lar, by the So cio log -
The Zig zags of Po lit i cal Re gime De moc ra ti za tion in Ukraine
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005 77
i cal Lab o ra tory of the Kharkiv Na tional Uni ver sity, among school chil -
dren in Luhansk oblast and stu dents in Kharkiv) reg is tered a growth in
po lit i cal in volve ment of young peo ple in school and uni ver sity pro grams
on de vel op ment of de moc racy and lo cal ad min is tra tion; the pro grams
gave them ini tial ex pe ri ence and ac quainted them with dem o cratic life. 
De spite the po lit i cal es trange ment man i fested by the “si lent ma jor -
ity”, ex pe ri ence of the elec tion cam paigns of 1999 and 2002 in Ukraine
clearly dem on strated that po lit i cal par tic i pa tion and dem o cratic
con t rol over the power were in the fo cus of pub lic at ten tion (con trary 
to the sit u a tion reg is tered by Yu. Levada in Rus sian so ci ety [19, p. 234]).
De spite the strong and con tin u ous pres sure of eco nomic and so cial
hard ship, the Ukrai ni ans man i fested a high in ter est in pol i tics, es pe -
cially in ac tiv ity of power bod ies. For ex am ple, in Luhansk oblast, two
thirds of re spon dents wanted to know more about the ac tiv ity of the
oblast and lo cal au thor i ties (63%).
It means that the prob lem lay not in the low pub lic at ten tion to dem o -
cratic op por tu ni ties but, firstly, in deep dis trust in the su preme so cial
and po lit i cal ac tors; sec ondly, in ab sence on the po lit i cal scene of lead -
ers, move ments, and par ties ca pa ble of over com ing this “thresh old of dis -
trust”, the force of so cial habit that the power did not care for a cit i zen, and 
can a liz ing the mass po lit i cal mo bi li za tion. 
In 2003–2004, Ukrai nian po lit i cal sys tem came to the bi fur ca tion point, 
when fur ther move ment would be pos si ble only in two fol low ing ways: 
— To “re duce” the il lib eral form of de moc racy due to deep en ing con -
tra dic tions with keep ing the es tab lished model of po lit i cal power
and then in ev i ta bly go to au thor i tar i an ism. 
— To lib er al ize the sys tem and de velop the lib eral ver sions of  demo -
cracy, which could limit the power mo nop oly, sep a rate busi ness,
pol i tics, and ad min is tra tion, as well as for mal ize the rules of their
in ter ac tion. 
Since 2000, so cial con fron ta tion has been strength en ing along the
lines of (1) com pet i tive elites; (2) be tween classes be ing formed within the 
small and mid dle busi ness, highly qual i fied pro fes sion als, large busi -
ness, on the one hand, and the power struc tures that tried to con trol
their ac tiv ity and get ben e fits, on the other hand; (3) the pub lic and the
power as a whole (Fig ure 3). 
This con fron ta tion was wors ened by the fight be tween the West (the
USA with their ac tive geopolitical course ex pan sion and the EU coun -
tries with their mod er ate po si tion) and Rus sia for in flu ence on Ukraine. 
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How ever, to fore see the Or ange Rev o lu tion — mainly “the re volt of
mass” (the term by J. Ortega y Gasset) — with the help of so cio log i cal
mon i tor ing, was prac ti cally im pos si ble: peo ple’s ma te rial con di tions
were im prov ing, but their so cial well-be ing wors ened and tra di tional in -
di ca tors of the pro test ac tiv ity were still low. It was the “nor mal” man i fes -
ta tion of the bi fur ca tion move ment, in which Ukrai nian po lit i cal sys tem
was sink ing once again and tak ing the whole so ci ety with it. How ever,
one should have no ticed that, while peo ple’s trust in dem o cratic in sti tu -
tions was very low, the com ing pres i den tial elec tion of 2004 was deeply
taken as a per sonal event: many peo ple con sid ered the elec tion as a
sig nif i cant event ca pa ble of chang ing the sit u a tion for the better not only
in the coun try, but also in their fam ily lives. For ex am ple, in Luhansk
oblast, this opin ion was ex pressed by 49% of re spon dents — see Ta b -
les 1, 2). These ex pec ta tions can also partly ex plain such a po lar iza tion
among at ti tudes to the lead ing can di dates for Pres i dent (ac cord ing to
the idea Tertium non datur, i.e. “a third is not given”) and readi ness to
fight for their choices. 
As the con fron ta tion be tween so cial, eco nomic, and po lit i cal forces
in ten si fied, the im pu dence and cyn i cism man i fested by power dur ing
the elec tion cam paign of 2004 gave im pe tus to a so cial ex plo sion. 
In the be gin ning of Sep tem ber 2004 most peo ple (in Luhansk oblast,
about 60%) were sure that ad min is tra tive pres sure would be used in the
elec tion cam paign. If we talk about prog no ses on the po lit i cal pro cess, one 
should have no ticed the dis tri bu tion of peo ple’s pos si ble re ac tions to the
ad min is tra tive pres sure (Fig ures 4, 5). De spite the fact that as sess ments
on pos si ble re ac tions of oth ers and their own var ied con sid er ably, look ing
at the dis tri bu tion of an swers (Fig ures 4, 5), one can eas ily see that peo ple 
de clared their per sonal po si tions and man i fested the hid den pro -
test, which could be come open un der cer tain con di tions. 
In that sit u a tion, as the ad min is tra tive re source could be in ef fi cient
or even cause the pro test be hav ior, the power was left with the only real
chance of “en sur ing” the elec tion re sults, that is to or ga nize their fal si fi -
ca tion. 
In the be gin ning of No vem ber 2004, in Luhansk oblast, we asked
respondents the fol low ing ques tion: “Cen tral Elec tion Com mis sion anno -
un ced pre lim i nary re sults of the first round of vot ing at the elec tion of the 
Pres i dent of Ukraine held on the 1st of No vem ber, 2004. Do you think that
the an nounced re sults are fair or not fair?” An swer ing the ques tion, 40%
of re spon dents chose the op tion “the an nounced re sults re flect the real
vot ing”, while 38% re garded the an nounced re sults of vot ing as fal si fied
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(Fi gu re 6). It is in ter est ing that, even in the be gin ning of July 2004, in an
ex pert ques tion ing, 21% of ex perts — the gov ern ment of fi cials — ei ther
thought that the fal si fi ca tion was pos si ble or were sure that it was in ev i -
ta ble. 
In ten si fy ing con fron ta tion be tween so cial, eco nomic, and po lit i cal
forces, the ob vi ous cyn i cism of the power ac tions, great ex pec ta tions of
peo ple about the pres i den tial cam paign re sults, which seemed to be un -
real, — all this (in the re sult) caused the so cial ex plo sion that meant (but
not only) over com ing dis trust of the pub lic in its own strength. The
dis trust and can a li za tion of the mass pro test were over come also due to:
a) the formed im age of the op po si tion leader of the “peo ple’s trust”, his
cha risma; b) op po si tion forces well or ga nized and widely rep re sented
through out the coun try; c) ap pli ca tion of the mass tech nol o gies for vir -
tualization of re al ity1. As a re sult, the “elites’ up rais ing” (Ê. Lash) turned
into “the re volt of mass” (J. Ortega y Gasset). How ever, if the “elites’ up -
rais ing” could be fore casted and was ev i dent even be fore the elec tion
cam paign had be gun, “the re volt of mass” was un ex pected. In our
opin ion, such an un ex pected char ac ter was a kind of man i fes ta tion of
the bi fur ca tion move ment, in which the po lit i cal pro cesses took place. At 
the same time, look ing at so cio log i cal in di ca tors at ten tively, one could
have no ticed the symp toms of pos si ble mass pro test much ear lier. 
In stead of Con clu sion
The Or ange Rev o lu tion gave a chance for lib er al iza tion of Ukrai nian
re gime. At the same time, the move ment of so ci ety and po lit i cal sys tem
on a “ra zor edge” at least will con tinue un til the par lia men tary elec tion of 
2006 that may help to con sol i date of those or other achieve ments of the
cur rent po lit i cal fight. The fu ture of de moc racy heavily de pends on abil i -
ties of those elites that came to power af ter the pres i den tial elec tions to
sep a rate busi ness and pol i tics, to es tab lish guar an tees for the ba sic
rights and lib er ties, trans par ent rules for in sti tu tional in ter ac tions and
con trol, on abil ity to over come po lit i cal split be tween re gions and to
main tain (or raise) the level of trust and loy alty among gen eral pub lic
and busi ness. Once again, the lead ing role in so cial trans for ma tion
passes to elites, while the pub lic re mains just witness what is going on — 
it is the paradox of democratic development.
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1
H. Pocheptsov an a lyzed pos si bil i ties for ap pli ca tion of vir tual tech nol o gies un der the power
change, as well as mech a nisms and pros pects of “vir tual rev o lu tions” [20].
Ap pen dix
The fol low ing graphs are made on the em pir i cal ba sis of sur veys con -
ducted by the So cio log i cal Lab o ra tory, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv Na tional
Uni ver sity, to gether with Vivat, con sult ing agency, in 2003–2004:
1. So cio log i cal mon i tor ing “Res i dents of Luhansk oblast speak
about them selves, oblast and lo cal au thor i ties, po lit i cal re forms”
— April 2003. The re al ized sam ple con sisted of 1189 re spon dents. The
de vi a tion of con trol in di ca tors of cal cu lated sam ple from the re al ized one 
was 1.4%. The sam pling was a mul ti stage, quote with a ran dom se lec -
tion of re spon dents in the ref er ence points. The sam ple is rep re sen ta tive
for adult oblast pop u la tion (over 18 years old) according to a kind of
settlement, sex, and age. 
2. So cio log i cal mon i tor ing “So cial prob lems and po lit i cal opin -
ions of Luhansk oblast res i dents – 2004” — April–May 2004. The re al -
ized sam ple con sisted of 787 re spon dents. The de vi a tion of con trol in di -
ca tors of cal cu lated sam ple from the re al ized one was 2.2%. The sam ple
was a mul ti stage, quote with a ran dom se lec tion of re spon dents in the
ref er ence points. The sam ple is rep re sen ta tive for adult oblast pop u la -
tion (over 18 years old) ac cord ing to a kind of settlement, sex, and age. 
3. Ex pert ques tion ing was be ing con ducted from the 11th till the 19th
of July in Luhansk oblast. The method was a half-for mal ized in ter view
with a hand out ques tion naire. 348 ex perts took part in the ques tion ing.
The meth od ol ogy of form ing the group of ex perts was based on a quote-
 ran dom se lec tion of ex perts from lead ers of or ga ni za tions (oblast and lo -
cal au thor i ties, pub lic health in sti tu tions, state and non-state en ter -
prises, mass me dia, in sti tu tions of ed u ca tion and cul ture, so cial ser -
vices, and employment agencies) of various levels. 
4. So cio log i cal mon i tor ing “Opin ions of Luhansk oblast res i dents
on the eve of Ukrai nian pres i den tial elec tion” was be ing con ducted
from the 14th till the 19th of Sep tem ber 2004 in Luhansk oblast. The re al -
ized sam ple con sisted of 1201 re spon dent. The de vi a tion of con trol in di -
ca tors of cal cu lated sam ple from the re al ized one was 1.8%. The sam ple
was a mul ti stage, quote with a ran dom se lec tion of re spon dents in the
ref er ence points. The sam ple is rep re sen ta tive for adult oblast pop u la -
tion (over 18 years old) according to a kind of settlement, sex, and age. 
5. So cio log i cal mon i tor ing of elec toral pref er ences of the vot ers,
who live in Luhansk oblast, was be ing con ducted from the 5th till the 7th
of No vem ber 2004. The re al ized sam ple con sisted of 780 re spon dents.
The sam ple was con structed in the same way. 
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Fig. 1. Ex tent of trust among adult pop u la tion of Luhansk oblast in the in sti tu tions of
gov ern men tal, oblast, and lo cal au thor i ties in Ukraine
(N = 1200, re sponse rate, April 2003, April 2004)
Fig. 2. Dis tri bu tion of an swers to the ques tion: “DO YOU BELIEVE THAT UKRAINE IS
ALREADY OR BECOMES SOON A DEMOCRATIC STATE?”
(N = 1200, re sponse rate, April 2003)
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Ukraine is already a
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It is possible, but in 5-10
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Fig. 3. The weight i est av er age in di ca tors of so cial ten sion be tween dif fer ent groups in
Luhansk oblast ac cord ing to ex perts’ as sess ments, July 2004 (5-point scale, where “5” is
a strong so cial ten sion, “1” is an ab sence of ten sion)
Ta ble 1
Dis tri bu tion of An swers to the Ques tion:
“DO YOU CONNECT YOUR HOPES FOR THE BETTER…
WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS WITH THE ELECTION
OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE?”
(The poll was con ducted in Luhansk oblast, Sep tem ber 2004,
 N = 1201)
…YOUR OWN LIFE 
(LIFE OF YOUR FAMILY) …SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY
1. YES 48.1 1. YES 51.6
2. NO 26.1 2. NO 21.4
3. DIFFICULT TO SAY 25.8 3. DIFFICULT TO SAY 27.0
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Between the local
authorities and
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Ta ble 2
Dis tri bu tion of An swers to the Ques tion
“IN YOUR OPINION, THE ELECTION
 OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE IS...”
(The only one op tion was to be cho sen; the poll was
 con ducted in Luhansk oblast, Sep tem ber 2004,
N = 1201)
1. ...An im por tant event for Ukraine ca pa ble of chang ing sit -
u a tion for the better 48.9
2. ...A usual thing that will not bring prin ci ple changes 31.6
3. ...An event that can cause a split in the so ci ety and
change sit u a tion for the worse  3.9
4. It makes no dif fer ence to me  4.4
5. It is hard to say 11.2
Fig. 4. Re spon dents’ as sess ment of ad min is tra tive pres sure ex ert ing on vot ers of their
 settlement dur ing the elec tion (Sep tem ber 2004, Luhansk oblast, N = 1201,
 re sponse rate)
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Fig. 5. Pos si ble strat e gies of re spon dents in the case they would be forced to vote against
their choice by the au thor i ties or lead ers of or ga ni za tions (Sep tem ber 2004, Luhansk
oblast, N = 1045, re sponse rate)
Fig. 6. Dis tri bu tion of an swers to the ques tion: “CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION
ANNOUNCED PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE FIRST ROUND OF VOTING AT THE
ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE HELD ON THE 1ST OF NOVEMBER,
2004. DO YOU THINK THAT THE ANNOUNCED RESULTS WERE FAIR OR NOT FAIR?”
(Luhansk oblast mas sive, No vem ber 2004, N = 780, re sponse rate)
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